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 Abstract: Accounting  is an important factor in recent transformations in 
the management of economic life in Romania. A marked convergence 
between private and public sector philosophies of administration has 
occurred and accounting has given operational substance to ideals of 
„efficiency”, „value for money”, „competitiveness” and „accountability”. 
Accounting increasingly shapes the language of policy and has become as 
much an indisputable benchmark of rational economic conduct as a 
substantive practice. However, to suggest that accountants have been 
integral to the new financial performance culture in which we now seem to 
live is also to reveal an irony. Two of the professional tasks which are 
closely associated with the image of these champions of performance are 
currently undergoing a crisis of „performativity” themselves. Financial 
accounting and audit, practices through which the wider dissemination of a 
„financial rationality” has occurred, are being questioned as never before. 
In this essay we focus upon the varied processes of negotiation, debate 
and accusation which constitute a „politics of financial auditing”.  
JEL classification: M41, M42 
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When innocent parties lose assets because of fraud or the economic collapse of 
apparently healthy companies, institutional processes of „blame allocation” are set in 
motion. These processes are competitive. Litigation may be one particular and 
specialized method of allocating blame but press comment, internal inquiries and a host 
of other deliberative mechanisms are equally significant. Within these various settings the 
allocation of blame is not merely a question of finding scapegoats but also has much to do 
with establishing descriptions or „problematisations” of the event which favor certain 
allocations of responsibility, and hence certain regulatory responses, over others. 
The political nature of regulatory blame allocation is revealed particularly acutely 
where the public criteria of success and failure for regulatory practices are imprecise. In such 
cases single events, have provoked generalized forms of inquiry about the nature of trust 
entities, banking supervision structures and forms of corporate governance. In the case of 
financial audit there is currently widespread doubt about what audits are for and, by 
implication, about the criteria for determining the difference between good and bad 
auditing. Accordingly, the politics of audit, though it may originate in particular events, also 
stimulates general concerns; it is as much about what an audit is as how it has functioned in 
any particular instance. 
In recent years it has become popular to problematise financial audit in terms of an 
„expectations gap”, namely, a discrepancy between the demands made by user publics  
  43 
Finances - Accounting 
on the audit function and practitioners” views of its role and capabilities. However, the 
imagery of the „gap”—as if there were well-defined points which needed to be brought closer 
together in some way—is too simple and static. Audit is always subject to such gaps since the 
circumstances under which it may be judged to succeed or fail are periodically subject to 
negotiation. The coherence of any practice depends largely upon a consensus about these 
circumstances but this is not to say that professional tasks must be fully transparent to 
their consuming publics; far from it. Rather, public conceptions of those tasks in the abstract 
must be sufficiently stable to tolerate particular deviations. When this consensus is disturbed 
by events such as corporate collapse, the institutional path of the disturbance corresponds 
to a political process which aims at a new form of consensus for the meaning of the 
practice, particularly its general criteria of success and failure. Furthermore, who decides 
and determines the public meaning of these criteria is as important as what  is decided, 
especially where such criteria continue to be expressed in imprecise terms which require 
specialist interpretation. 
In the next section, we describe the official image of auditing as a practice which is 
generally successful. This is followed by a consideration of the nature of financial 
reporting. Problems of financial audit and financial reporting are often confused in the 
public imagination, and the politics of audit is at its most intense where companies fail in a 
substantive economic sense and auditors are blamed for approving financial statements 
which did not give warning of this outcome. We argue that, intensity notwithstanding, the 
forms of response and negotiation in these cases are cosmetic in an important sense; they 
favor regulatory responses to critical events which particularize, proceduralise and 
institutionalize.  Such responses systematically ignore the „cost-assurance” relationship 
which lies at the very heart of the audit process. 
1. Representing the mission of audit 
External financial audits have been officially defined as an „independent examination 
of and expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an enterprise”. The audit adds 
credibility to these statements. All companies are at present required by law to produce 
such statements, commonly called accounts, for their owners (shareholders). In this way it 
is thought that management is made accountable to shareholders and that the periodic 
production of accounts enables shareholders to make rational investment decisions. 
In law it is the directors who are responsible for the preparation of financial 
statements. External financial auditors act on behalf of, and report to, shareholders (even 
though they commonly regard management as the „client”) to ensure that the accounts 
given by management are not fundamentally misleading. In Romania, the auditor must 
given an opinion on whether the accounts give a true and fair view. The auditor collects 
evidence as a basis for this opinion, a process which, over the years, has been regulated by 
professional statements of best practice. When financial statements are „technically 
defective”, in the sense of failing to „represent” the economic condition of a company, 
auditors are required to act in one of a number of institutionally prescribed ways: requiring 
accounts to be amended; expressing a „qualified” public opinion on the accounts; in 
certain circumstances reporting directly to a third party such as a regulator. 
Financial accounting and the representation of economic reality 
The official representation of the mission of financial audit given in the previous 
section can be disturbed in a number of ways. Given that the perceived success of the 
audit process is heavily dependent upon the capacity of the financial statements to reflect 
the economic condition of the company, then the politics of financial audit cannot easily  
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be disentangled from processes of negotiating and criticizing the role of accounts. An 
abiding image of financial reporting is that it is the neutral representation of the financial 
affairs of an entity which provides information to a potentially diverse body of interested 
parties, principally investing publics. In Romania the official rules of accounting assist 
and fine tune this representational function. Sometimes the rules are shown to be in-
adequate and must be reformed. However, the principal idea of accounting as a technology 
which assists in the operation of capital markets is an enduring one. To the extent that audit 
enhances the credibility of financial accounting, then it also contributes to the efficiency of 
the markets for financial capital. On this view, financial accounting is an „apolitical” 
practice with merely an instrumental role in assisting the rational decision-making of 
investors. 
However, this official image is difficult to sustain for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it has long been recognized that the standard-setting process for financial reporting 
is political in the sense of being subject to interested pressures for particular outcomes. In 
this sense the precise form of financial accounting is perceived as having „economic con-
sequences” for certain parties who will then be disposed to attempt to influence the 
standard-setting process. 
Secondly, the representational aspirations of accounting are undermined by 
„creative” accounting practices which exploit the indeterminacies of official rules to 
reflect the performance of the enterprise in a desired manner. Some critics have argued that 
accounts can be whatever one wishes. Indeed, it is in the nature of rules that they cannot be 
written to control entirely the conditions under which they are applied and certain 
accounting areas, such as the setting of provisions, are difficult to prescribe and lend 
themselves to forms of „creative compliance”. However, creative accounting in this sense is 
not simply a by-product of the rule-making process. It is also a function of what auditors 
will permit. 
Auditors, far from being the guardians of economic reality, are perceived to 
have conspired with management to assist in creative accounting practice.  
Thirdly, the representational ideal of financial accounting can be undermined in a 
much more radical way. It is not just that creative accounting distorts our view of an 
independent economic reality; accounting practices effectively constitute that reality. In 
the context of management accounting, accounting systems provide a medium through 
which organizations become „visible” to themselves.
 That which is newly „visible” can be 
interpreted not as a representation of an independent reality but as the creation of a new 
domain of economic facts. Accounting therefore constitutes the economic facts that it 
purports to represent. The communication of economic „facts” in financial statements is 
simultaneously their construction as facts. 
This is not such a strange and philosophical idea as it sounds. Consider recent 
debates in the UK about whether coal pits are or are not „profitable”. In adversarial 
contexts such as this, concepts of „cost”, and therefore of profit, are subject to many 
assumptions and are highly negotiable. In these instances one can say with some plausibility 
that different „accountings” determine different economic „realities” of the pit. From this 
point of view there is no single „true” representation of the economic condition of the pit, 
merely competing ones mediated by particular forms of accounting. 
Another example concerns the recent debates about whether valuable but 
„intangible” brand names should be „assets” on the balance sheet.
 There can be little 
doubt that accounting for brands in this way does not merely „represent” them as if they 
were entirely independent of financial reporting and valuation methods. Brands are  
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constituted as real in a particular sense by accounting. More generally it can be argued 
that accounting constitutes a model of social reality. In this sense accounting is contestable 
not simply in terms of better or worse accounting for a particular class of transactions; 
preoccupations with creative accounting effectively accept the representative role that 
accounting has set itself. Rather, accounting provides the dominant medium through 
which companies make themselves visible both internally and externally. As a highly 
selective form of receptivity to outside disturbances, traditional financial accounting 
treats certain effects of corporate activity, such as upon the natural environment, as non-
facts. Relative to the accounting knowledge system, these effects are „unreal” and the 
present trend for environmental disclosures in annual reports does nothing to disturb the 
dominant logic of financial accounting representation of corporate activity. This logic is 
reinforced and made legitimate by financial audit. 
Overall, the sense in which the „auditee” company succeeds or fails (in the role of 
auditee) depends upon the definition of its performance which is relevant to the audit 
process. To the extent that financial reporting is far from being a simple representative 
practice then such definitions are far from being stable. This legalistic definition sits 
uneasily with emerging preoccupations with corporate governance which emphasize a 
broader set of stakeholders in corporate activity. In other words, financial reporting is 
now under pressure to develop in new ways at a time when its traditional role is uncertain. 
All of which makes the financial auditors” role problematic. 
              2. Negotiating audit failure 
Audit can be represented as successful where the auditor has reported particular 
financial statement failure by „qualifying” his audit report publicly or, less publicly, by 
reporting to a relevant third party such as a regulator. However, success in both these cases 
can be contested. For example, one company had previously received a qualified audit 
report on the grounds that the auditors had doubts about whether it could continue as a 
going concern. While this information would have been communicated to shareholders in the 
accounts, and was „publicly” known in the sense that the qualified audit report was available 
for public inspection, it was not made evident to the customers who subsequently lost money.  
Clearly, much hangs in this instance on what it is „reasonable” to expect of the 
audit function and the litigation against auditors Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse may, 
if it ever arrives in court, have something to say on this. There is a long history of 
preoccupations with the financial auditor’s role in relation to the discovery of material 
fraud and currently there are some indications that they may accept an extension of their 
responsibilities. This shows that what is „reasonable” may change over time, as reflected in 
the development of official audit guidance. Furthermore, public events may dilute the ability 
of auditors to retain professional discretion in determining the content of „reasonable” 
practice. In this sense the politics of audit is as much about who is to control the definition of 
„reasonable” practice as it is about the content of that definition. 
For many years auditors have been concerned that they have been unduly 
burdened with the risk of financial statement failure. In response they have emphasized 
directors” responsibilities for providing systems of internal control and have lobbied 
unsuccessfully for recognition of this fact in company law and in the tort of negligence. 
More recently this campaign for „risk sharing” has been conducted in terms of a new 
agenda for corporate governance in which the role of the financial auditor is articulated as 
but one part of the total control environment of the corporation. This reinforces the  
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traditional defense that it is unreasonable to blame auditors when errors and irregularities 
have their source in corrupt management practice. 
There are certain dangers for auditors in pushing this idea of risk-sharing too far. 
It is not unreasonable to argue that the manifest economic success of firms of financial 
auditors has in fact been aided and not hindered by ill-defined conceptions of their role. 
High expectations generate high fees. In seeking to „spread risk” auditors may devalue 
their own product. In addition to pressures on audit fees, there is also evidence that the 
recent financial scandals have provided a platform for „professionalisation” initiatives by 
internal auditors, who are employees of organizations, in making claims upon the territory 
of corporate governance. Indeed, some audit fee reductions indicate a level of corporate 
substitution between the internal and external audit function. It seems that auditors cannot 
limit expectations about their role without also limiting their capacity to earn high fees. 
Important as the negotiation of „reasonable” audit practice is, the politics of 
financial auditing is also characterized by a certain „cosmetics” of response. In the wake 
of financial scandals in which the audit function is implicated, audit must be seen to respond. 
The restoration of a consensus about the mission of audit often takes the form of new 
practice recommendations by the auditing authorities. Hence, an important product of the 
politics of audit is the body of codified procedure which is produced in the wake of perceived 
public failure. One might even suggest that the production of discussion documents and 
audit guidance in the wake of such scandals is as important as what they say; being seen to 
be serious about reform is an important political resource. But, in these cases, audit 
knowledge is codified and procedurals in a manner which also leaves untouched the 
problematic relation between audit work done (inputs) and assurance given (output). In our 
view, the politics of audit is as much about leaving this core problem alone as it is in 
promoting better practice. It is this issue to which we now turn.   
         3. The politics of audit 
So far we have considered three possible representations of the success or failure 
of audit practice. Firstly we presented the official story of audit success coupled with 
financial statement success. Secondly we considered the sense in which financial 
statements might be said to succeed or fail. Thirdly we considered the negotiation of audit 
failure in the context of financial statement failure. These discussions correspond to 
boxes 1, 2 and 3 respectively in Figure 1. The latter describes the „logical space” within 
which the politics of audit, the market for interpretations of its efficacy, occurs. Figure 1 
also enables an analytical distinction to be made between two issues which are often 
confused; auditee and auditor failure. The difference between the two rows in Figure 1 
concerns the performance criteria of companies in their capacity as auditees. we have 
considered in some detail the continuing debates about the adequacy of financial 
accounting as a reflection of corporate activity. The difference between two columns 
concerns the success or failure of the audit process itself and we have discussed the 
problems of negotiating „reasonable” audit practice in the contested territory between 
boxes 2 and 3. 
 
Table no. 1 The logical space of the politics of financial audit 
 
    AUDITOR FAILURE 
  No  Yes 
AUDITEE 
FAILURE 
No  1  4 
Yes  2  3  
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The idea of a „politics of financial audit” refers to the institutional settings in 
which the four possible representations of the audit process in Figure 1 can be negotiated. 
This negotiation involves the need to settle the criteria of success and failure in general for 
both auditee and auditor. However, it is also apparent from the figure that we have not 
addressed the possibility that audits may „fail” and yet not be seen to fail because the 
financial statements are not technically defective. This is an intriguing possibility because 
public knowledge of the efficacy of the audit process is usually mediated by the perceived 
integrity of the financial statements. By the same token, financial statement non-failure is 
often regarded as evidence of audit success. Figure 1 suggests that both these inferences are 
misleading; box 4 represents the logical possibility that audits can fail but are not publicly 
seen to do so. Are there any institutional processes which correspond to this possibility? 
Regulating audit knowledge 
A distinction between the „ethical” and „technical” failure of audit practice can be 
drawn. Ethical failure can be said to occur where auditors fail to report reportable matters 
which have come to their attention. This form of failure is closely associated with long-
standing concerns about the independence of auditors. The audit profession has resolutely 
resisted attempts to change existing institutional arrangements for audit, such as by rotating 
audit firms and prohibiting the provision of non-audit services. However, over time, 
concessions have been made with the intention of improving the image of the 
independence of audit. The audit industry can no longer appeal to the ethical „attitude of 
mind” of its practitioners, a rhetoric which is increasingly hollow in the face of a more 
commercial way of talking.
  However, by comparison with the considerable level of 
commentary on the question of ethical failure, i.e. non-independence, there has been little 
„politicization” of „technical” failure until recently. 
Public institutional mechanisms to question the fundamental basis of the audit 
product, i.e. the relationship which is presumed to exist between work done and levels of 
assurance available, do not exist. Other than in very limited circumstances where 
statistical technologies are available, this fundamental relationship is largely a matter 
for professional hunch. 
From this point of view an important „non-politics” of financial audit becomes 
apparent and defines a set of issues which even critics of auditing are unable or unwilling to 
face. Visible preoccupations with procedure, the codification of incremental and very 
specialized audit routines, and proposals for new institutional structures create a certain 
specialized density around the audit function such that a more radical and systematic 
conception of audit failure cannot become a public issue. From such a radical point of view 
the weakness of the knowledge base of audit and the problematic nature of the audit product 
would be apparent. 
The „non-politics” of audit failure must not be understood in conspiratorial 
terms. It is primarily a function of the regulatory system within which audit operates. A great 
deal of financial regulation presupposes  the efficacy of audit. Without audit as the 
possibility of some form of ex post inspection, financial regulation would appear 
unenforceable. To preserve the mission of financial regulation, the politics of regulatory 
blame has an inherent tendency to particularize audit failure and to proceduralise in its 
wake. In addition, regulatory response is heavily weighted towards the creation of new 
institutional  structures, such as the suggestions for creating an „audit panel” or a 
„general audit council”. The result of these three tendencies is what we call, uncharitably 
perhaps, a „cosmetics of response”. New licensing rules for auditors, ethical codes,  
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reporting functions and duties, official routines and new regulatory bodies for audit 
reconstitute the mission of financial audit in the wake of scandal. Yet these elaborations also 
prevent a more fundamental problematisation of the audit product and it is to this that we 
turn in conclusion. 
4. The future of financial audit 
Today we hear much of environmental audit, safety audit, medical audit, academic 
audit and many others beside. This institutionalized belief in the productive benefits of 
verificatory activity is such that one might describe today as an „audit society”. Audit has 
become the condition of the functioning of a distinctive style of regulation, and to be 
audited is to be made an accountable and thereby legitimate economic agent. It was 
suggested above that because audit is a presupposition of regulatory programmes, a radical 
problematisation of audit practice is not a regulatory option. Hence, the politics of audit 
functions as much to circumscribe debate as to allocate blame within the system of 
financial regulation. Audit failure paradoxically but inevitably leads to a reintensification of 
audit. At the point where systemic doubts about audit might be possible, the response is to 
have more if it. 
We propose additions to the existing reporting responsibilities of auditors; 
respectively, to shareholders on the compliance of the company with the code of best 
corporate practice, and to wider interest groups on a range of issues. In both these cases the 
likely effect is to amplify expectations about the audit function. Furthermore, we endorse 
institutional innovations such as enhanced audit committees, audit panels and shareholder 
audit representative groups. 
Whether or not these are implemented is less important than the style of regulatory 
response which they symbolize. We belief in the efficacy of audit and seek to extend it in 
new directions. Initial conceptions of the expectations gap were premised upon public 
ignorance of audit which could only be remedied by changing the wording of the audit 
report. Now it is the scope of audit which must be extended to meet public expectations. 
However, to reinterpret the „expectations gap” in these terms also conceals real doubts 
and confusion about the level of assurance which financial audit provides. 
It may be that the desire is not for more audits of new corporate statements but 
for clarification of the audit product and the nature of the attest function which constitutes 
it. 
It is conventional practitioner wisdom that higher levels of assurance are more 
costly and yet this assurance-cost function is, to say the least, difficult to specify 
empirically. It is also part of the conventional history of audit that it has evolved in the 
direction of greater efficiency in the sense of the development of techniques which give a 
greater level of assurance for any given level of cost as compared with their predecessors. 
These „stories of audit” are reinforced by a growing regulatory dependence on audit, a 
dependence which ensures that the idea of systematic audit failure cannot become a theme 
in the politics of audit. Indeed, the politics of audit is concerned to prevent a situation 
arising where we might be required to think of alternative institutional mechanisms to audit. 
In the „audit society” these alternatives are literally unthinkable. To conclude, it seems that 
the politics of financial audit does not merely give voice to the doubts of aggrieved 
parties. It also channels and translates these doubts into thinkable and therefore workable 
regulatory solutions; disciplinary action against particular individuals, the production of 
new official procedures and the creation of new institutional mechanisms.  
  49 
Finances - Accounting 
REFERENCES 
1.  Arens A., 
Loebecke J. 
Audit. O abordare integrat , Editura Arc, Chi in u, 2003 
2.  Cr ciun   .  Auditul financiar  i auditul intern. Controlul financiar  i 
expertiza contabil , Editura Economic , Bucure ti, 2004 
3.  Naser  K.  Creative financial accounting: its nature and use, Editura 
Prentice Hall, 1993 
4.  Rusovici A.  i 
colectiv 
Auditul situa iilor financiare în entit  ile economice, Regia 
Autonom  Monitorul Oficial, Bucure ti, 2006 
 